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California Custody Awards to Non-parents:
A View of Civil Code Section 4600
INTRODUCTION
Within the last five years the California Legislature has enacted
a comprehensive Family Law Act.' Section 46002 of this act covers
custody proceedings for minor children, the preferences to be con-
sidered when an award of custody is made, and the allegations nec-
essary when an award is made to a non-parent. Under prior Cali-
fornia law, custody of a minor child could be made to a non-parent
only after an express finding of unfitness of the natural parent.
Section 4600 has obviated the necessity of first finding parental un-
fitness. Now, before the parent may be deprived of custody, the
court must first find that it would be detrimental to the child to
be in the custody of the parent, and secondly that an award to
a non-parent would be in the best interests of the child.
On its face the dual findings required under section 4600 would
seem to be a less strict standard than that of parental unfitness.
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4400, et seq. (West 1970).
2. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1974):
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor
child, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at
any time thereafter, make such order for the custody of such child
during his minority as may seem necessary or proper. If a child
is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelli-
gent preference as to custody, the court shall consider and give due
weight to his wishes in making an award of custody or modification
thereof. Custody should be awarded in the following order of pref-
erence:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child.
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been
living in a wholesome and stable environment.(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be
suitable and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance
for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person
or persons other than a parent, without the consent of the parents,
it shall make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would
be detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is re-
quired to serve the best interests of the child. Allegations that pa-
rental custody would be detrimental to the child, other than a
statement of that ultimate fact, shall not appear in the pleadings.
The court may in its discretion, exclude the public from the hearing
on this issue.
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The thesis of this comment is that although the findings re-
quired under section 4600 have been modified, there will be little
or no change in the frequency of custody awards to non-parents.
The new Family Law Act will not significantly change California
custody awards to non-parents because of (1) the level of evidence
required in custody proceedings; (2) the constitutional limitations
placed on the court involving relations between parent and child;
and (3) the expressed legislative intent behind section 4600.
The cumulative effect of these three factors will be such that,
although procedurally the custody action has been modified by sec-
tion 4600, this act will not significantly increase the removal of
minor children from their natural parents.
THE CHILD AS PROPERTY AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The California courts have generally followed the rule that when
there is a custody proceeding for a minor child the court must give
preference to the natural parents before custody may be given to
strangers. 3 This basic rule of parental preference has been ration-
alized and expressed through two basic theories.
The first of these theories was expressed in the case of In re
Campbell.4 The court discussed the common law basis for the right
of the parents as against strangers to the custody of minor children.
It cited Kent's Commentaries and his discourse on the natural right
of the parents to the custody of the child. This court determined
that:
Under the general law ... the father has a natural right to the
care and custody of his child. . . . [T]he right of custody is essen-
tially the same as the right of property. For though the subject of
the right is not saleable, it is valuable and of all species of property
the most valuable to the parent. 5
The court continued its discussion of the parents' natural right to
custody in its statement that the court was not free to appoint cus-
tody to a stranger unless there was evidence of parental incom-
petence.6
3. Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal. 2d 441, 260 P.2d 44 (1953).
4. 130 Cal. 380, 62 P. 613 (1900). This case was a guardianship pro-
ceeding decided under California Civil Code § 197, which is now California
Probate Code § 1407.
5. Id. at 382, 62 P. at 614.
6. Id. at 382-83, 62 P. at 614.
This theory of natural right was followed and reaffirmed by a
series of cases which spanned over fifty years. In Newby v. Newby 7
and in Stever v. Stever" (which upheld the earlier Newby ration-
ale) the court held that the "interest of a child will be best sub-
served by awarding its care to a parent, unless he or she is unfit
to have its care."9 The court held that the legislative intent behind
the custody statutes at issue,10 when construed together, "contem-
plate that the natural right of the parent to the care of a minor
child, if a fit and proper person, shall prevail as against an entire
stranger."1
This natural right theory was further buttressed by the cases of
Roche v. Roche 2 and Stewart v. Stewart.13 In Stewart the court
recited the well established rule that "The court may not award
custody to strangers merely because it feels that they may be more
fit or that they may be more able to provide .... ,,14
In Roche, however, the lower court based its decision directly on
section 138 of the Civil Code.' 5 The trial court awarded custody
to the child's grandparents rather than to the parents. Section 138
stated that the court, in awarding custody of a minor child, should
be guided by what appeared to be the child's "best interests."' 6 The
Supreme Court reversed the lower decisions at the trial and appel-
late levels. It flatly declared that the parental right was such that
it required the court to award custody to a parent unless the parent
was found to be unfit.17
This principle of parental preference in custody proceedings was
expressed differently by Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion
7. 55 Cal. App. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921). This case involved an appeal
from a child custody award made in a divorce action. The case was re-
versed by the appellate court on the basis of California Civil Code §§ 138
and 246.
8. 6 Cal. 2d 166, 56 P.2d 1229 (1936).
9. 55 Cal. App. 114, 116, 202 P. 891, 892 (1921).
10. California Civil Code § 138, which was repealed by Stats. 1969, c.
1608, p. 3313 and replaced by California Civil Code §§ 4600 and 197.
11. Supra note 9.
12. 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944).
13. 41 Cal. 2d 447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953). The mother appealed a custody
award to a non-parent on the basis that the award had been made without
first having found the mother unfit.
14. Id. at 451, 260 P.2d at 47.
15. § 138 of the California Civil Code, since replaced by § 4600, provided
that in awarding custody of minor children the court should be guided by
what would be in the child's best interests. It also stated that if the child
were of sufficient age and able to form an intelligent preference, the court
could consider that preference in awarding custody.
16. Id.
17. 25 Cal. 2d 141, 143, 152 P.2d 994, 1000 (1944).
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in Guardianship of Smith.'5 The modern view was that the prefer-
ence was to be given to the natural parents because the parents'
claim to first consideration was in fact synonymous with the best
interest of the child.19 A fit parent would naturally be responsible
for the child's welfare. 20 Additionally the court wished to preserve
established family units21 and to refrain from intruding into areas
of life that should be left to the private interest.22 Justice Tray-
nor admitted that cases could possibly arise in which the child's
interests would not be served by a custody award to the parents.2 3
However, in such cases the parents' insistence on their right to the
child's custody when such custody would obviously harm the child
would itself be evidence of unfitness. 24
This policy of parental preference based on the best interests of
the child found support in later decisions. 25 Although the courts
applied the same rule of law, the difference was that the decisions
were written on the basis of modern considerations in regard to
family life, and not on the outdated feudal law of an analogy to
property rights.
UNFITNESS AS A BAR TO PARENTAL RIGHT
As previously stated, parental preference in child custody pro-
ceedings could only be overcome after it was proven that the
natural parents were unfit to care for the child. The definition
of "unfitness" was never thoroughly developed in the decisions that
dealt with the issue of parental unfitness.26 The question of fitness
18. 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954). The trial court had awarded
custody of the minor children to the daughter of a deceased mother. The
natural father appealed on the basis that the trial court had not found the
father unfit. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Carter, re-
versed.
19. Id. at 94, 265 P.2d at 891.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 96-97, 265 P.2d at 892.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. In re Miller, 244 Cal. App. 2d 454, 53 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1966); Marlow
v. Wene, 240 Cal. App. 2d 670, 49 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966); Application of
Miller, 179 Cal. App. 2d 12, 3 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1960).
26. Guardianship of Turk, 194 Cal. App. 2d 736, 15 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1961);
Guardianship of Smith, 147 Cal. App. 2d 686, 306 P.2d 86 (1957); Guardian-
ship of Morris, 107 Cal. App. 2d 758, 237 P.2d 989 (1951).
was one of fact and there were basically no strictly applied judicial
standards. 27 Rather than use strict criteria the court generally con-
sidered the parents' character, emotional stability, neglect or dis-
dain toward the interests of the child, and the parents' acts or con-
duct toward the child. 28
One of the more recent discussions of unfitness was contained in
the case of O'Brien v. O'Brien.2  That case quoted a definition fol-
lowed in a Massachusetts case30 which stated:
[T]he word usually although not necessarily imports something of
moral delinquency. Violence of temper, indifference or vacillation
of feeling toward the child, or inability or indisposition to control
unparental traits of character or conduct, might constitute unfitness.
So, also, incapacity to appreciate and perform the obligations rest-
ing upon parents might render them unfit, apart from other moral
defects.81
The quoted definition rather loosely defined parental unfitness as
either moral delinquency or incapacity to perform the obligations
of a parent.
In order to apply a stricter test of unfitness strong evidence of
unfitness was required before the preferential right of the parent
could be overcome. Thus the fact that a mother was poor and had
to seek charity to support her child was held not sufficient to justify
an award of the child to a third party.32 Nor was evidence of some
lack of integrity,33 or past indifference to the child 34 held to bar
the right of the parent to custody of the child.
Further limits on custody procedures were established when the
courts also refused to grant custody to non-parents "merely because
it feels that they may be more fit or that they may be more able
to provide financial, educational, social or other benefits. 3 5 The
effect of this qualification in addition to the requirement of clear
and convincing proof of unfitness tended to limit placement of chil-
dren with non-parents. Only when the court was convinced that
the physical, moral, and emotional well-being of the child was im-
periled because of the unfitness of the parents would a custody
27. Guardianship of Wisdom, 146 Cal. App. 2d 635, 304 P.2d 641 (1956);
Guardianship of Casad, 106 Cal. App. 2d 134, 234 P.2d 647 (1951).
28. Id.
29. 259 Cal. App. 2d 418, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1968).
30. Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 180 N.E. 508 (1932).
31. 259 Cal. App. 2d 418, 422, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427 (1968).
32. In re Mathews, 174 Cal. 679, 164 P. 8 (1917).
33. In re Akers, 184 Cal. 514, 194 P. 706 (1920).
34. In re Green, 192 Cal. 714, 221 P. 903 (1923).
35. 41 Cal. 2d 447, 451-52, 260 P.2d 44, 47 (1953).
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award to a non-parent take precedence over an award to the
natural parent.
This rule of parental preference and its corollary that the parent
must be proven unfit before a custody award would be granted
to a non-parent did not totally escape criticism. 3 6 However, as
previously shown, the rule was repeatedly affirmed by the Cali-
fornia courts. In 1969 the California Legislature passed a compre-
hensive Family Law Act which included statutes to cover child
custody proceedings.37  Section 460038 of this Act has significantly
changed the procedure involved in a custody award to a non-parent.
The remainder of this article will analyze the changes that took
place with the passage of section 4600 and its effect and possible
implications in regard to custody awards to non-parents.
AN ANALYSIS OF CHANGES UNDER SECTION 4600
Section 4600 of the Family Law Act specifically states that it shall
apply "In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of
a minor child." Therefore, in any of the various proceedings in
California where custody of the child is either a central or collateral
function of the action section 4600 will be applied.3 9 Section 4600
has specifically been applied in guardianship proceedings 40 and in
custody proceedings arising in the juvenile court.4 1 It has been de-
clared the uniform rule in all custody proceedings.4 2
Subsection (a) retains the parental preference rule which was
established under previous statutory and case law. The second
paragraph of section 4600 has abrogated the old requirement
of parental unfitness before an award to a non-parent may be
ordered. Under the new statute a finding of unfitness of the parent
is not required, but a finding of both of two statutory conditions
36. Guardianship of Casad, 106 Cal. App. 2d 134, 234 P.2d 647 (1951);
Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 60, 223 P.2d 32 (1950) (dicta); Roche v.
Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 144, 152 P.2d 999, 1000 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
37. CAL. CIv. CODE, §§ 4600-4603 (West 1970).
38. See supra note 2.
39. See generally, Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Pro-
ceedings-Problems of California Law, 23 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1971).
40. Guardianship of Marino, 30 Cal. App. 3d 952, 106 Cal. Rptr. 655
(1973).
41. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
42. Id.
is essential before an award to a non-parent.48
Section 4600 states that the court shall first make express findings
that (1) an award of custody to the parents would be detrimental
to the child and (2) an award to the non-parent would be in the
best interests of the child. The new code specifically recognizes
and reinforces the parental preference stated in the first paragraph
of the section by requiring the court to make the dual findings of
detrimental effect and best interests of the child.
It may be argued that the new law has reduced the substantial
standard of parental unfitness. Theoretically, therefore, more
awards to non-parents would be made under section 4600 than were
ordered under the old standard of unfitness. What may be detri-
mental to a minor child and in -his best interests would seem to
be a more liberal test than the former requirement of parental un-
fitness. Additionally, under the new law what is "detrimental" has
not been defined. The language of section 4600, if broadly con-
strued, could well result in more awards of custody of minor chil-
dren to non-parents.
However, the potential for an increase in the number of awards
to non-parents, when considered in conjunction with three impor-
tant modifying factors will be significantly lessened.
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND SECTION 4600
The legislative intent in respect to parental preference and
awards of custody to non-parents was stated in the report of the
Assembly Judiciary Committee. The report expressed the concern
of the Committee that courts might unilaterally remove minor chil-
dren from the custody of parents merely because the court disap-
proved of the parents' mode of living.44 The reason for the new
amendment was for the "Limitation of the court to award custody
of children to persons other than a parent. . . ,,45 (This was the
"primary intent of the provisions in the new act relating to child
custody. ' ' 46 )
The primary intent of the new act was to make it more difficult
for the court to award custody to a non-parent. For a court to
greatly increase awards to non-parents would be to ignore the ex-
pressed intent of the Legislature.
43. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 952, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 660 (1973).
44. 4 CAL. ASSEMBLY J. (1969 Reg. Sess.) at 8060-8061.
45. Id. at 8060.
46. Id.
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As can be readily seen from the Committee report, the legisla-
tive purpose was to reinforce the right of parental preference, not
to weaken it. The report further stated that, "The important point
is that the intent of the Legislature is that the court consider paren-
tal custody to be highly preferable. Parental custody must be
clearly detrimental to the child before custody can be awarded to
a non-parent. '47 The enactment of section 4600 changes the former
requirement of detriment to the child, but the express intent of
the Legislature is that an award to a non-parent should only be
made in highly unusual cases.
SECTION 4600 AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
In the recent Supreme Court case of In re B. G., 48 the court had
the first juvenile court custody case before it since the passage of
the Family Law Act. This action was 6 case in which the superior
court had awarded custody to a non-parent against the claim of
a parent expressly found fit to provide care for the children.
Two years earlier the court had found the children to be depend-
ent children of the court and had placed them in the custody of
foster parents when their father had died shortly after having
entered this country as a political refugee from Czechoslovakia. 49
The mother, who had remained in Czechoslovakia, had not been
notified of the original dependency hearing.50 Though the court
found the mother was a fit parent it concluded that the children's
best interests required the continuation of maintenance in a foster
home.51 It made no finding of whether an award of custody to
the mother would be detrimental to the children.5 2
The Supreme Court reversed. The court, speaking through
Justice Tobriner, stated that section 4600 expressly gave preference
to parents over non-parents in custody proceedings.53 Justice
Tobriner concluded, "that section 4600 permits . . . custody to a
non-parent against the claim of a parent only upon a clear show-
ing that such award is essential to avert harm to the child. '' 54 He
47. Id. at 8061.
48. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
49. Id. at 684-85, 523 P.2d at 246-48, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 446-48.
50. Id. at 685, 523 P.2d at 248, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
51. Id. at 686-87, 523 P.2d at 248-49, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49.
52. Id. at 687, 523 P.2d at 249, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
53. Id. at 698-99, 523 P.2d at 255, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56.
54. Id.
referred to the earlier California case of Ferreira v. Ferreira,55 in
which the court had characterized the harm necessary to remove
a child from the custody of 'his parents.5 6 The parent was to
receive custody unless the act would "seriously endanger the child's
health or safety. '57 Such jeopardy to the child included proof of
"substantial emotional harm or other forms of injury in addition
to physical mistreatment. '58 A mere allegation that the award be
based solely on the child's best interest or welfare is not sufficient
when an award to a non-parent is sought. 9
The California Supreme Court has placed strict limits on the
application of section 4600 in its decisions which have involved cus-
tody awards to non-parents. The court has stated that only in an
exceptional case should the court in such a custody proceeding move
to place a child in a home other than that of the natural parent.
SECTION 4600 AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution presents an
additional limitation on California courts when the rights of parents
and their children are involved. Under guidelines enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court, any state action is subject to certain
limitations when it touches familial rights and relations. When an
award of child custody has been made to a person other than the
natural parent, the attorney who represents that parent should
make sure such award has been made within the strictures of the
fourteenth amendment. Although the rights guaranteed have been
enunciated in broad terms, the parents and their attorney should
make every effort to ensure that their particular case has been
given the protection that the fourteenth amendment affords to
familial rights and relations.
Certain rights are guaranteed protection under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment if they "are so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental." 60 In Griswold v. Connecticut6'1 the Court stated that var-
ious guarantees under the fourteenth amendment have created
certain zones of privacy upon which the state must not trespass.
55. 9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973).
56. Supra note 48 at 699, n.27, 523 P.2d at 258, n.27, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
458, n.27.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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One of these zones of privacy is the "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter. '62 Logically there would seem to be
a fourteenth amendment right on the part of a parent to the cus-
tody of his child. This statement, of course, is subject to the qualifi-
cation that the state may enter into private family relations
if there is a proper and substantial state purpose.6 3
The protection of the welfare of children is a legitimate and com-
pelling state interest. Yet the countermanding rights "to marry,
establish a home and bring up children," 64 are grouped among "the
basic civil rights of man."65  Section 4600, as all laws which seek
to effect and control basic human liberties, must be strictly con-
strued in order not to violate these liberties.
The dual findings necessary before a child may be removed from
the custody of the parent must be narrowly applied so as not to
transgress the parents' rights to raise their family as they see fit.
Unless there is a clear and present need to remove the child in
order to protect his physical or emotional well being the courts
should not disregard the parents' right to custody of their children.
CONCLUSION
Through an analysis of legislative intent, case law, and constitu-
tional implications, this comment shows that section 4600 of the
Family Law Act will not present a radical change in child custody
awards to non-parents. Because of the nature 'of the subject and
the unique interests involved, child custody awards to non-parents
will always be subject to strict standards and close scrutiny. The
California courts have always given preference to parents and sec-
tion 4600 has not replaced this traditional concept.
CHARLES T. MCHUGH
62. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
63. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.'1 (1965).
64. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
65. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
